F-106 DELTA DART
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Convair
F-106A
590142
1959
333
340 (277 A, 63 B)
1960-10-01
1960-11-23
1963-08-27
unknown
456th,498th
Oct 1960 - 333rd F-106 produced by Convair at San Diego CA
13 Feb 61 - To 456th FIS Castle AFB CA 01 May 63 - To 498th FIS, 325th FW, McChord AFB WA 27 Aug 63 - Mid-air collision. Crashed off Puget Sound, WA during a night ECM/ECCM intercept training mission against an TB-57E. Capt. Roger C. Axlund killed during ejection. He was was observed ejecting, but was never found. An air, surface and shoreline search failed to find any trace Wednesday of an Air Force flier whose F-106 supersonic fighter clipped an RB-57 medium bomber over the Pacific. Early training for interceptors usually involved a friendly bomber training for their own mission and the interceptor training for his and the two meeting up at some point. Ground control would vector the interceptor to a point where either the interceptor pilot (F-51s) or his on-board radar (F-94s,F-86s, F-89s, and finally F-106s) could track the incoming bomber on his own. Well, sometime in the late 1950s someone in the USAF decided to begin using the Martin B-57 Canberra to test the air defenses of the US. They decided to use the B-57 because of its size, range, speed, and altitude capability. The B-57 did this, at first, without any special additions. No electronic gadgets or anything. But, as the interceptors got better at their jobs, the USAF decided to modify several RB-57As (R standing for reconnaissance)to do the job better. They added several black boxes and chaff dispensers and viola! they had a good target. These became part of Defense System Evaluation Squadrons. Eventually, though, B-57Bs and B-57Es were also modified accordingly. The EB-57s were used for many years to test the air defenses of the US. In fact, the last of the type to operate for the USAF were EB-57s, the last of which were retired in 1982. The F-106 was basically an F-102 up-engined and integrated with a fire control system. The external differences between the two are easy for most to discern. The F-106's air intakes were moved behind the cockpit and the vertical stabilizer was chopped off compared to the F-102's. The first F-106 rolled off the assembly line in 1956. The last one was retired in 1988! Relatively unheard of, as compared to siblings like the F-104 and F-105, it stood guard at home while the others went off to war in Vietnam. Though, it did deploy to forward bases like Korea and Labrador (Though, one wonders how a TDY to Labrador, Canada compared to one to Korea). Sometime during the afternoon of August 27, 1963, First Lieutenant Roger C. Axlund of the 498th FIS, began his flight planning routine for a night ECM/ECCM intercept training mission against an EB-57E (According to the accident report, it was a TB-57E, though the B-57 did not have a training variant. The B-57E had dual controls and was sometimes used for training and was hence designated a TB-57 in those instances. And some referred to it as a TB-57 at all times. Because it was being used as a defense system evaluator, it will be referred to as an EB-57 here.) temporarily deployed to McChord AFB, Washington from Hill AFB, Utah. Lieutenant Axlund would likely have been taken out to his aircraft about an hour before launch. He was assigned to F-106A #59-142 and took off at 0005 on August 28, 1963, with two+ hours worth of fuel. The EB-57 had departed McChord AFB at five minutes before midnight with 4+ hours of fuel. SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, a kind of Air Defense Ground Control) conducted the approach. Both the B-57 and the F-106 (Six) were in contact with the SAGE controller. The B-57 was communicating with voice comm, while the six was using a data-link (only mandatory safety and intercept calls were made by voice). Weather was clear, visibility was six miles in smoke. The mission had been fully briefed between the crews of the Sixes and the B-57, since the ECM equipment in the EB-57 was new to the ADC training inventory. The B-57 turned on all of its jammers (four in number) until one of the generators failed, so the crew turned off the forward two jammers. This would be no problem since all of the attacks were expected to be from the aft quarters. F-106 59-0142 with 1Lt Axlund, accompanied by a wingman in another F-106, took off at 0005 for the interception mission against the USAF RB-57 out of Hill AFB, Utah. The weather was clear with 6 miles visibility. The two F-106's would conduct intercepts, alternating attacks. The B-57 maintained 250 KIAS (Knots Indicated Air Speed) and headings as directed by the SAGE controller. Axlund called two successful attacks to the SAGE controller, even though there was non-standard language used. Axlund had reported no malfunctions or deficiencies. He made another visual contact on the B-57 and called separation on and visual contact with the other F-106. He then called a lock-on to the ECM jamming source and was attempting to close on the “target” again when his F-106A collided with the RB-57 at 0109 about 20,000 feet over the ocean about 15 W of Destruction Island. The six's vertical stabilizer hit the B-57's number one engine (Left) and the six continued on from under the B-57's wing. The top 52 inches of the vertical stabilizer separated from the F-106. The B-57 reported the collision to the SAGE controller and turned back toward McChord, about 95 miles East. The collision occurred at 0109 local, at 47 degrees 43 minutes N. , 124 degrees 45 minutes West. This was approximately 15 miles off shore, due West of Destruction Island, Washington. Axlund was observed flying straight and level for about a mile toward the shore before beginning a gentle turn to the left. He did not transmit after he reported the ECM lock-on, about three minutes prior to the collision. The UHF antenna was destroyed in the collision. The F-106 wingman had Axlund in sight and watched him begin an accelerated descent, seemingly stabilized on a heading toward shore. Axlund's aircraft began to pitch down and increased speed, in the opinion of the Six wingman observing him, into the trans-sonic region. Somewhere under 20,000 feet and about 5 miles over the ocean off the mouth of the Queets River on the Olympic Peninsula, the observer saw a flash from Axlund's aircraft, which he took to be an ejection. Immediately after that the wingman lost visual and radar contact with Axlund's plane. The B-57 returned to McChord safely. The crew was uninjured, though the pilot had to shut down his number one engine due to fire/overheat indications. The report of a possible ejection from 59-0142 prompted an air-ground search for the missing pilot. Several leads were developed that led searchers to believe that the pilot may have landed on the rugged coastline. A fisherman who saw the collision also saw a parachute drifting down toward land. Later that same evening a camper heard three gunshots in the vicinity of the beach in the search area. The USAF later estimated that wind and ocean currents could have pushed the parachute within a mile of the shore. The week long search was conducted by USAF helicopters from McChord AFB, and Coast Guard helicopters from Port Angeles Coast Guard Station as well as fixed wing aircraft from the Coast Guard auxiliary. They were joined that weekend by fixed wing aircraft and ground teams from the Civil Air Patrol. Over 30 members of the Search and Rescue Council from various cities conducted an extensive ground search of the shoreline and a half mile inland. Rescue boats from La Push Lifeboat Station searched off shore. No trace of the pilot 1st Lt Axlund was ever found. He was declared dead by the US Air Force on 4 September 1963. The track on the map that came with this partial report shows that the intercepts were conducted from the North Western tip of Washington down to about even with the Kalaloch area, where the collision occurred. The left and right elevons appear to have drifted quite a ways, having been located somewhere in the vicinity of Grays Harbor. The hand drawn map appears to have been copied several times and is of poor condition. As ever, there seems to be very little information here. I know there is more out there. I would like to search newspapers from the era and area to see what they say, but my time and money are always in demand elsewhere. If ANY of you reader have something to add, PLEASE feel free to do so! Do it in a comment or e-mail me. I will do my best to publish it if you request it! There are a few questions that rise here: What caused Axlund to misjudge the distance between him and the B-57? His aircraft was armed with training missiles. The F-106 had no guns, so getting THAT close to another aircraft when not refueling or flying formation seems unwise at best. Did Axlund suffer oxygen deprivation? Why else would he have gotten that close and not avoided a collision? There are several cases that support the stability of the Six in un-piloted flight, which would seem to support his not being conscious just prior to the collision.
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1Lt Roger C. Axlund
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instruments in 1961. Fuselage cut in half at station 412 (Aft bulkhead missile bay) and a new fuselage, cockpit section, and nose section was installed with the latest production avionics, the same as the last F-106A 590148 and F-106B 590165. A total of 35 aircraft (28 "A" models and 7 "B" models) were converted and reassigned to various ADC units.. Tactical Vertical: Models factory produced w/Tactical Vertical instruments: late 1957 and all 1958, 1959.. F-106 Specifications
31-05-2021
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