**USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT**

**1. DATE OF OCCURRENCE (Name, month, and day)**

1966 June 13, Monday

**2. VEHICLE/ MATERIAL INVOLVED**

Accident F-106A 58798

**3. FOR DISCLOSED ACCIDENTS ONLY**

(Flight Code and Report Serial No.)

**4. PLACE OF OCCURRENCE, STATE, COUNTY, DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM NEAREST TOWN, IF ON BASE, DISTANCE FROM NEAREST BASE, CITY NAME, NEAREST TOWN, STREET NAME.

Lake Huron 48 NM W.

Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan

**5. HOURS AND TIME ZONE LOCAL (a.m. or p.m.)**

Estimated 1307 EST

**6. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING OWNING VEHICLE OR MATERIAL AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE.**

Major Command: ADC

Subcommand or AF: 1 AF

Wing: 36 Air Div

Group: 1 Ftr Wg

Squadron or Unit: 71st Ftr Intcp Sq

**7. BASE AND COMMAND SUBMITTING REPORT (Do not abbreviate)**

Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan, Air Defense Command

**8. LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED**

(For aircraft include operator and all other persons whether in plane or not. If more space is required to list all personnel, use an additional sheet(s).)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>M.I.</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Service No.</th>
<th>Assigned Duty</th>
<th>Aero Rating</th>
<th>Injury</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VINOPAL, William</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>F846683</td>
<td>Fit Comdr</td>
<td>Sr Pilot</td>
<td></td>
<td>M1555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**9. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT.** Give a detailed history of flight, or chronological sequence of facts and circumstances, leading to the accident. Include, if applicable, the results of investigation and analysis to include discussion of all factors listed, findings, and recommendations, and any corrective action taken. (Continue on reverse, if more space needed.)

Attached

**10. AUTHENTICATION**

President, Accident Investigation Board

GUY HURST JR

Colonel, USAF

Signature

DATE: 2 May 1966

AF FORM 711 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE

2500 PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 D - 48929
F-106A Number 58-798 was lost over Lake Huron shortly after 1300 Eastern Standard Time on 13 June 1966. The missing aircraft was one of four interceptors scheduled for training on 34th Air Division low level Route #2 against a single T-33 target. The aircraft was loaded with three WSEMS (Weapon System Evaluator Missiles), no external tanks. The tactical call sign was Juliet Lima 05 and the fighter was piloted by Major William J. Vinopal; Major Vinopal also conducted the pre-mission briefing. He followed the outline in the squadron briefing guide for mission particulars and reviewed low level intercept techniques and hazards. Takeoff time was to be 1740Z.

Maintenance specialists were called to correct armament and computer problems in the fire control system before the aircraft was ready to leave the parking ramp. An illuminated Missile Displaced warning light on the cockpit master caution panel was cleared by armament personnel (the three WSEMS were reseated on their respective missile rails and the missile lock T-handles were re-actuated). The M-14 computer hangup was fixed by reseating electronic printed circuit cards in the computer compartment. Ground crews confirmed the "go" status of the aircraft through interphone communications with Major Vinopal before securing the work areas.

The pilot checked in with Selfridge tower on local channel 2, 275.8 mcs, received taxi clearance and scramble instructions, then taxied to runway 18 for takeoff. He made the radio call, "pine, canopy, pressure, pilot heat," as he took the runway. The mobile control officer later stated that in looking over the aircraft during engine runup and takeoff he saw nothing unusual. Where no deviation is evident, the route of flight is plotted to conform with 1st Fighter Wing SOP's. Fighters taking off to the south climb to and maintain 4,000 feet and 300 knots while in a 30° bank left turn to a 320° heading. Once past the Selfridge 090° TACAN -dial, acceleration is begun to the Tech Order climb schedule. Unless cleared otherwise by FAA, the pilot intercepts the military climb corridor northeast of the field and tracks inbound on the Peck TACAN 192° radial, climbing to his assigned altitude.

Selfridge RAPCON called Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center to advise them JLO5 was airborne at 1756Z. One minute later 05 checked in with center on frequency 343.8 mcs. Center established radar contact and the fighter was cleared for climb to 15,000 feet. The center controller directed Major Vinopal to alter course around some unfavorable weather as he proceeded north-easterly at 15,000 feet. At 1803Z JLO5 cancelled IFR and was directed to contact Burnish Control on the tactical frequency. At the time of handoff 05 was heading 020°, 29 n.m., NNE of Selfridge.

The T-33 had been under Direction Center control for 30 minutes when JLO5 checked in. The target pilot had reported weather conditions over the desired low level route and had determined it would be best to stay over lower Lake Huron on a north-south track. Prevailing weather in the area of intercept consisted of scattered cloud layers at 6,000 feet and 10,000 feet and a high broken layer. In-flight visibility was reported by PIREP at between 2 miles and 10n, depending on proximity to localized rainshowers. Some maneuvering was required to remain clear of the showers but none of the aircrews reported any difficulty maintaining VFR. During the time JLO5 was committed against him, the T-33 pilot stayed at 3,000 feet with an indicated airspeed of 230 knots. He employed no evasive action.

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Major Vinopal checked in with the Intercept Director at 1:30, reported "Aircraft Safety Check complete", and presumably followed SAGE data link commands. Pant 34 was given a descent from 5,000 feet to 3,000 feet for the target leg, and JLO5 turned to an easterly attack vector. Major Vinopal’s last radio transmission was at 1807Z when he called "JLO5 JUDY". His data link command altitude was 3,000 feet. His position was approximately 6 n.m., east of the Michigan shoreline, 030° from Selfridge at 50 n.m. His flight path was in trail with the T-33 heading south. Machine printouts of SAGE track data show uninterrupted reliable tracking on 05 until approximately this time. Burnish no longer had good tracking on 05 but carried a dead reckoned plot just behind the target. The IND later stated he had satisfactory Mode II SIF from 05 until he was 2 to 3 miles in trail with the target. At 1807.42 the aircraft plot was over the lake, 030°/49 n.m., from Selfridge AFB. No transmissions from JLO5 were received to indicate altitude during the intercept; however, for as long as the aircraft functioned normally, most probably altitude was 2,000 feet to 3,000 feet.

Radar tracking on the T-33 continued reliable as it proceeded south. The target pilot turned to a northerly heading to avoid weather shortly after passing over the southern shoreline of Lake Huron, 9 n.m., east of Sarnia, Ontario. He was unsuccessful in several attempts to re-establish radio contact with the fighter before and during his turn to 360°. At 1817Z, JLO3, a second F-106 coming in on target, was told "check behind the target for JLO5". JLO3 reported a "contact" and possible "REMO", then later replied that JLO5 must have broken away to the port, he had only the target on radar. The IND answered a query by the T-33 pilot with the reply that he no longer had radar contact with 05. JLO3 was paired again with the T-33 at 1829Z. At 1835Z the Intercept Director vectored Pant 36 and JLO3 to search for JLO5.

At 1823Z Burnish called Cleveland ARTCC and advised them 05 was no longer in contact. At 1825Z the Weapons Director called Selfridge to report lost R&R with JLO5 to the Wing Command Post. Thirteen minutes later the Wing called back to request Rescue be notified and to relay 05's last known position. At 1845Z Coast Guard Air Station, Detroit, was informed of a possible "downed aircraft". Coast Guard Operations diverted a helicopter, airborne for local training, to the search. At 1855Z the Wing Command Post scrambled the AF Rescue H-43 and at 1917Z submitted an Apex Beeline Report. Search operations expanded throughout the afternoon and evening. Two T-33's departed Selfridge at 2000Z, a third at 2020Z; at 2100Z a second CG chopper took off and at 2145Z an HC-97 was airborne. Search efforts were halted for the day when fog thickened after sundown.

Tuesday, June 14th the weather improved. The Coast Guard Cutter Bramble, dispatched shortly before 0200Z the previous night, arrived and assumed duties as on-scene command post. Two smaller CG utility boats from CG Station, Port Huron, were also used in the search. Crash debris was first sighted at 1955Z; approach plates, a high pressure pneumatic flask, oxygen converter, a pilot's helmet pad, and blue baseball cap, identified as belonging to Major Vinopal, were picked up by helicopter.
The Coast Guard placed a marker buoy in the general area where most of the debris was located. Coordinates of the buoy were 43° 17.9' N, 82° 14.8' W. Very little of the airplane was recovered; small chunks and pieces of honeycomb, insulative blanket, survival kit components, ejection seat headrest, tubing, and a charred WREM tape spool were brought in on the 14th and 15th. Active search efforts were secured at 0500Z on the 15th; CG choppers made periodic passes over the area until Headquarters 9th Coast Guard District closed the case on June 24th.

During the evening of 27 June, debris that had washed ashore was picked up by tourists on Ipperwash Beach near Kettle Point, Ontario, Canada. The beach is 12 miles SE of the buoy anchored in the initial debris area. Honeycomb and insulation was picked up along a one mile stretch of beach on 27, 28 and 29 June.

The Navy Supervisor of Salvage arranged a contract for surface search by a sonar equipped civilian firm. Operations started June 28 and continued until August 16. Search results were negative.

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