The UNC's response to the
North Korean attack in the JSA and
the ax murders was the planning and
execution of "Operation Paul Bunyan", cutting down the tree.
The primary
American combat ground unit in the Republic of Korea is the US Army's 2nd
Infantry (Indianhead) Division (2ID). Elements of the division were normally
deployed tactically in camps north of Seoul to the DMZ and in from of the west
coast about 40 kilometers. On any given day large elements of the division are
in the field training for combat - 18 August 1976 was no exception. Upon
notification of the murders at the JSA, all units of the UNC including I Corps
(ROK/US) Group, all ROKA units, and the 2ID then under the command of Major
General Morris J. Brady, were alerted and told to prepare for action. Some 2ID
units were in the field training, and were above the Imjin River and its
tributaries.
This proved to be no small obstacle, for about 20 kilometers east of
Panmunjom
several bridges over the river had been rendered un-crossable due to high water
from the previous three days of rain. The only bridge available to get back
south for units training in the Santa Barbara Range area was the bridge at
"Little Chicago." By the morning of 19 August 1976 those elements which were
required to return to base camps to prepare for combat had done so and were
deployed to their war positions to await orders.
Meanwhile, the governments of
South Korea, and the United States conferred on all possible courses of action.
All of us stationed in Korea at the time knew we could not let the North
Koreans have their way, or there would be much more trouble later. Once the
decision was made by governments involved, the planning for "Operation Paul
Bunyan" began. The US Air Force moved in units from the Continental United
States (CONUS), Okinawa, and Guam to Korea; and the US Navy moved the 7th
Fleet consisting of the USS Midway carrier battle group to Korean Waters.
All units of the 2ID continued
to improve their war fighting capabilities by moving to their war positions or
locations designated by the Division Commander to support the operation.
Battalion Ammunition Officers throughout the division were ordered to
distribute their units "Basic Loads" and prepare for re-supply operations.
From 18 August 1976 through the morning of 21 August 1976 tensions along the
DMZ were particularly tense. The North Koreans tried several times to
shoot down US military aircraft patrolling just south of the southern boundary of
the DMZ. The defensive radar sites were scanning very high amounts of
increased activity on the Northern side of the DMZ. Soldiers of the quick
reaction force of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu), 2ID, waited on a
helicopter pad just minutes away from the JSA at Camps Kitty Hawk and Liberty
Bell. Meanwhile elements of the 2ID Division Artillery were positioned at
firing point 4P1 (North of the Imjin River) and at (South of the Imjin River)
Camp Pelhem in Munsan Ni/Songuri; the home of the 2nd Battalion, 17th Field
Artillery (DS). In addition, firing batteries from the 1st Battalion, 38th
Field Artillery (DS) had also deployed to positions close enough to support
Operation Paul Bunyan.
Elsewhere in the
2nd Infantry Division area, tensions were very high. All personnel were
preparing for combat, even the biggest duds turned into soldiers. The troops
were especially interested in what was happening at Panmunjom while we
prepared for war, the mood turned from shock after receiving the news of the
murders to "Lets go cut that damn tree down." If the North Koreans really
wanted to make an issue over it - we would be only to happy to oblige them.
On Saturday 21 August
1976, everything was ready. All units who were to participate in
"Operation Paul Bunyan" were in position and personnel briefed."
Coordination between ROK military and US military units was well
exercised.
At 0645 hours, the UN
JSA Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Vierra gave a message to the
"Joint Duty Officer" (JDO) to be handed to his KPA (North Korean)
counterpart. The message stated that at 0700 hours this day a UNC work
force would be entering the "security area" of the JSA and commence to
pruning the tree in vicinity of CP3. In addition, the message stated
that should there be no interference, the work force would depart the
JSA compound."
At 0700 hours, Task
Force Vierra entered the JSA security compound and moved directly to the
Poplar tree next to CP3. Along with the work force was approximately 60
ROK Special Forces soldiers forming a ring around the 16 engineer
soldiers from the 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2ID, cutting the tree. In
addition, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu), 2ID moved
into position as a quick reaction force to support the Task Force Vierra.
Behind the 2/9th was a forward observer from the 1st Battalion, 38th
Field Artillery (Steel Behind the Rock), 2ID waiting for orders to fire
a massed artillery strike. Behind him were AH-1 "Cobra" gunships
orbiting just out of site beyond the ridges, then F-111 Fighter Bombers,
and behind and way above them were B-52 Stratofortresse's.
As the engineers began
cutting down the tree there was little
to no reaction from the North
Koreans. They were totally taken by surprise, and had no clue about what
they should do because of the show of force made by the ROKUS forces was
so unexpected. It has been said that although the engineers planned
to cut down the tree their chain saws failed so instead they blew
the tree up to bring it down. Some of the photo's however clearly
show where chain saws have cut the tree, so I'm not sure how accurate
these stories are about the chain saws failing.
When the engineers had
completed there mission of cutting down (blowing up) the tree, Task Force Vierra, the
JSA Security Force and all vehicles departed the JSA compound.
However, "Operation
Paul Bunyan" was not over, only the overt part of the operation had been
completed. Over the next few weeks the units of the 2nd Infantry
Division and UNC Joint Security Force - JSA remained on a high state of
alert to counteract any military action taken by the North Koreans.
It has been reported
(unconfirmed as of 9 Jul 2012) that Major General Morris J. Brady got shot down
while flying his own helicopter taking a hit in the tail rotor drive
shaft while over-flying North Korean territory.
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Participating
Units of "Operation Paul Bunyan"
8th United States Army
I Corps (ROKUS) Group
51st Signal Battalion, I Corps
2nd Infantry Division
Task Force Brady
Armored Task Force - 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry; 1st Battalion, 72nd
Armor
2nd Aviation Battalion
52nd Aviation Battalion
1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu)
2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu)
4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry
2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (DS)
1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery (DS)
6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (GS)
Task Force Vierra
JSA Security Force
B Company, 2nd Engineer Battalion
D Company, 44th Engineer Battalion
1st ROK Division Reconnaissance Company
1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry
1st ROK Special Forces Brigade
38th ADA Brigade
Various US Air Force units (F-4s, F-111s, B-52s)
US Navy 7th Fleet & the aircraft carrier USS Midway
2D
Discom
S&T BN
2 MED BN (directly supported medevac choppers
attached from 498 Air Ambulance Co
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The Monument
 
Sep 2001
 
Oct 2003
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