

59-0029

28 Jul 61

319 FIS

REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AFR 62-14 and AFM 62-5. Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheets and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A - GENERAL INFORMATION

51 103

1. DATE OF ACCIDENT 28 July 1961	2. HOUR AND TIME ZONE (Local) 1717 CDT	3. DAY DAWN NIGHT DUSK Day	4. AIRFIELD OF LAST TAKEOFF BHAFFB, Ind.
5. PLACE OF ACCIDENT: (a) Distance (Nautical Miles) and direction from nearest airport (if on an airport, identify) <u>8 NM SW BHAFFB, Ind.</u> (b) Distance (Nautical Miles) and direction from nearest town (include state and county)			
6. AIRPORT DATA. Fill in (a) or (b) as applicable (For seaplanes landing on seadrome, fill in length of landing lanes and other data as applicable. Discuss in Section K.) (a) If accident occurred on airport: Length of runway in use _____ Ft. Heading of runway in use _____ Degrees. Field Elevation _____ Ft. MSL Type of runway surface (Check) Concrete _____ Asphalt _____ Other (Specify) _____ Wet _____ Dry _____ (b) If accident occurred off airport: Elevation at scene of accident <u>800</u> Ft. MSL Was aircraft taking off, approaching or maneuvering to land? Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No _____ If Yes, state airport involved <u>BHAFFB, Ind.</u> If No, state nearest airport suitable for landing this aircraft _____ For other airport mentioned in 6b above: State airport type (i.e., AF, A, N, CG, PC, P) Heading of runway in use <u>220</u> Degrees. Airport elevation <u>813</u> Ft. MSL			
7. CLEARANCE: (Check all applicable) IFR _____ VFR _____ Local _____ DD Form 175 _____ Other <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>CC1 Scramble</u> Cleared Direct _____ Cleared via airways _____ Cleared from <u>BHAFFB, Ind.</u> Cleared to <u>BHAFFB, Ind.</u>			
8. Base submitting report <u>BHAFFB, Ind.</u>	9. Duration of flight <u>1 / 20</u>	10. Mission of flight <u>ADC Scramble</u>	
11. ALTITUDE DATA: (a) Altitude of aircraft above terrain at which accident sequence began <u>1200</u> Ft. (b) Altitude, MSL, at which accident sequence began, or at which failure occurred <u>2300</u> Ft. MSL (c) Highest altitude, MSL, aircraft flown on this flight <u>42,000</u> Ft. MSL. Length of time at this highest altitude <u>1 hour</u>			
12. List Numbers of all Other Aircraft Involved (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft) (a) Was aircraft painted in accordance with standard Air Force conspicuity criteria? _____ Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No _____			
13. VIOLATIONS: Yes _____ No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> If Yes, Discuss in Section K.			
14. BREACHES OF AIR DISCIPLINE: Yes _____ No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> If Yes, discuss in Section K. <u>NW3</u>			

Section B - AIRCRAFT

15. AIRCRAFT NUMBER <u>59-0029</u>	16. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES AND BLOCK NUMBER <u>F106A - 105</u>	17. ASSIGNMENT AND STATUS CODE at time of accident: <u>CC</u> (As specified in AFR 65-110)				
18. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING AND REPORTING AIRCRAFT ON AF-110 REPORTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT						
Major Command <u>ADC</u>	Subcommand or AF -	Air Division <u>30th AD SAGE</u>	Wing -	Group <u>Chicago AD Sector</u>	Squadron or Unit <u>319th FIS</u>	Base <u>BHAFFB, Ind.</u>
19. IF AIRCRAFT WAS BEING FERRIED OR DELIVERED INDICATE: (Gaining and losing organizations, date of transfer, ultimate destination) <u>No</u>						

Section C - PILOT(S) INVOLVED (Flight Crew)

20. OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)							
a. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) <u>GARRISON</u>	FIRST NAME <u>ROBERT</u>	MIDDLE NAME <u>MARTIN</u>	GRADE <u>Capt.</u>	COMPONENT <u>Reg AF</u>	SERVICE NUMBER <u>50651A</u>	NATIONALITY <u>US</u>	YR. OF BIRTH <u>[REDACTED]</u>
b. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Front or Left Seat <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rear or Right Seat _____			c. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER AC _____ IP _____ P <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CP _____ Other (Specify) _____				
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION							
Major Command <u>ADC</u>	Subcommand or AF -	Air Division <u>30th AD SAGE</u>	Wing -	Group <u>Chicago AD Sector</u>	Squadron or Unit <u>319th FIS</u>	Base <u>BHAFFB, Ind.</u>	
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR FLYING							
Major Command <u>N/A</u>	Subcommand or AF -	Air Division -	Wing -	Group -	Squadron or Unit -	Base -	
f. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED <u>Pit 23 May 44</u>	g. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED <u>CP 2 Jul 59</u>	h. INSTRUMENT CARD Type <u>AF Form 8 AB</u> Date of expiration <u>22 June 62</u>	i. AFSC Primary <u>1125F</u> Duty <u>1125F</u>				
21. OTHER PILOT							
a. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) <u>N/A</u>	FIRST NAME -	MIDDLE NAME -	GRADE -	COMPONENT -	SERVICE NUMBER -	NATIONALITY -	YR. OF BIRTH -
b. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Front or Left Seat _____ Rear or Right Seat _____ Other _____			c. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER AC _____ IP _____ P _____ CP _____ Other (Specify) _____				
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION							
Major Command -	Subcommand or AF -	Air Division -	Wing -	Group -	Squadron or Unit -	Base -	
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR FLYING							
Major Command -	Subcommand or AF -	Air Division -	Wing -	Group -	Squadron or Unit -	Base -	
f. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED	g. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED	h. INSTRUMENT CARD Type _____ Date of expiration _____	i. AFSC Primary _____ Duty _____				

NOTE: IF MORE THAN TWO PILOTS ARE INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) REPORT SAME INFORMATION REQUIRED IN SECTION C ON ADDITIONAL SHEET FOR EACH.

Section D - FLYING EXPERIENCE OF PILOT(S) INVOLVED

If "Yes," check one

22. WAS OPERATOR ON INSTRUMENTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE: Yes No Unknown Weather Hood

ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER <small>NOTE: List all time to the nearest hour</small>	(Complete items 23 through 39 for each crewmember pilot)				
	PILOT (Last Name)	CO-PILOT (Last Name)	INSTR. PILOT (Last Name)	AIRCRAFT CMDR. (Last Name)	STUDENT PILOT (Last Name)
	GARRISON				
23. Total flying hours (including AF time, student time & other accredited time)	3,757				
24. Total jet time	1,815				
25. Total 1st pilot/IP hours, all aircraft	3,421				
26. Total weather instrument hours	191				
27. Total 1st pilot and IP this model (F-100)	222				
28. Total 1st pilot and IP this series (F-100C)	156				
29. Total pilot hours last 90 days	42				
30. Total 1st pilot and IP hours last 90 days	42				
31. Total pilot hours weather and hood last 90 days	18				
32. Total pilot hours night last 90 days	4				
33. Total 1st pilot and IP last 90 days this model	35				
34. Total 1st pilot and IP last 30 days this model	18				
35. Total 1st pilot and IP last 90 days this series	32				
36. Total 1st pilot and IP last 30 days this series	18				
37. Date and duration, last previous flight this model	27 July 61 2:00				
38. Date and duration, last previous flight this series	27 July 61 2:00				
39. Date of last proficiency flight check	5 Dec 60				

40. INSTRUCTIONS: Attach a copy of AF Form 5 for pilot(s) involved as outlined in AFR 62-14.

Section E - PERSONNEL INVOLVED

(Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at time of accident 41.	Name (Last name first, Grade, Serial Number and Component or Service) 42.	Type Aero Rating 43.	ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT Command, Subcommand, Group Number and Type, Base 44.	Injury Class. (or missing) 45.	Parachute Used		Ejection Seat Used	
					Yes 46.	No 47.	Yes 48.	No 49.
PILOT <i>01</i>	GARRISON, ROBERT M. Captain, 50651A (Reg AF) <i>A</i>	CP	ADC, 30A Air Div, 319 Ftr Intcp Sq, Bunker Hill AFB	<i>WATR Minor</i> 3	X		X	<i>A</i>

NOTE: If additional space is required to list all personnel involved, attach additional sheet.

Section F - WEATHER

(At time and place of accident)

Sky Conditions	Visibility	Wind Direction and Velocity	Temperature	Dew Point	Alt. Setting	Other Weather Conditions
40120	1 1/4	S W G G20	72	70	29.89	TRW-H

If weather, including wind conditions, was a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer.

Section K

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

F-106A, number 59-029, 319th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Bunker Hill Air Force Base, Indiana, hereinafter identified as VP-05, was lead aircraft in the third flight of two aircraft each that were launched for normal interceptor training missions on 28 July 1961. The three flights were scheduled for take off at 30 minute intervals starting at 1400 CDT, round robin from Bunker Hill AFB on IFR clearance under control of Chicago Air Defense Sector (SAGE). Time enroute was briefed as 1 plus 20 with 2 hours fuel aboard. All flights were briefed for a GCI/GCA recovery with the hand-off from Whizbang (CHADS) to Bunker Hill Radar at a point 15 NM on the 345° radial of Bunker Hill TACAN. A severe weather warning for this area issued by Kansas City was in effect at scheduled take-off times and was forecast to be valid throughout the mission. (It should be noted that Bunker Hill was in 31 forecast severe weather warning areas during the month of July.) However, Bunker Hill local forecast was in accordance with this, and Patterson AFB, Ohio was designated as the primary alternate. All three flights were launched with VP-05 and 06 departing at 1509 CDT with an expected approach clearance time of 1630 CDT. Flight proceeded as briefed, working with GOblin Control for practice intercepts. The flight was returned to Whizbang at 1624 CDT.

Prior to contacting Whizbang, both VP-05 and 06 experienced fuel gage malfunctions; however, readings returned to normal at 1623 CDT with 4,000 lbs indicated by VP 05. In the interim, the first four aircraft in the mission had cancelled IFR with Whizbang prior to hand-off due to a large thunderstorm in the vicinity of the GCI-GCA gate. These four aircraft penetrated and landed under VFR. Whizbang contacted Bunker Hill approach control for clearance at 1630 and was advised that Bunker Hill radar was painting a large precipitation area at the GCI/GCA gate and asked if the flight would prefer a TACAN/ILS approach from the 51 NM point on the 219 radial. Whizbang queried the pilot of VP-05 who, in turn, advised that there appeared to be a thunderstorm on the TACAN/ILS route and requested GCI/GCA. Aircraft at this time was 20 miles west of the GCI/GCA gate. Whizbang vectored VP-05 and 06 left to a heading of 180°. Whizbang again contacted Bunker Hill approach control and requested a TACAN/ILS penetration for VP-05 and 06. Bunker Hill AC contacted Indianapolis Center at 1630 CDT and requested TACAN/ILS penetration clearance for the flight. VP-06 was unable to find 05 due to poor aircraft radar and was penetrated separately. VP-05 started penetration at 1639 CDT with final fuel report to Whizbang of 3000#. He was given existing weather of one thousand scattered, 1,400 broken, visibility 6 miles with thunderstorms through Northwest and North. by Bunker Hill approach control. He was later advised of severe rainshowers in all quadrants except East through South. On contact with Bunker Hill radar, VP-05 was advised of intermittent radar contact and requested to report over the TACAN. (319th Operations were listening channel 16 to monitor progress of VP-05.) When over the TACAN, VP-05 was vectored 100°, and later to 280° for dog leg to final. After VP-05 received warning for turn onto final, the aircraft experienced AC power failure and the pilot requested a no gyro type approach. VP-05 was instructed to "turn left, now" and twenty seconds later instructed to "stop turn now, switch to channel 17 for final controller". (During the turn, VP-06 had contacted radar on channel 16) VP-05 was unable to contact on channel 17 and 38 seconds after leveling out of turn, he re-established contact on 16 and was advised to turn further left. The aircraft never appeared on precision radar, and at approximately 5 miles range, 3½ miles right of course, VP-05 was turned out to a cross wind leg for another attempt. At this time the local weather was indefinite, 500 feet obscured, visibility 1 mile in heavy thunderstorm. Due to poor internal coordination and lack of a simultaneous weather display system for GCA, the pattern controller was not aware of the latest observation, and consequently,

did not pass it to VP-05. Shortly after starting around, VP-05 advised that he could now make turn to headings. While on crosswind leg, VP-05 again experienced complete fuel gage failure and gages remained near zero for the remainder of the flight. On second approach VP-05 was turned final at 7 miles and passed to final controller without frequency change. VP-05 was given a surveillance approach with headings and initial descent instructions without subsequent range and altitude calls. The pilot was not advised of the type of approach. Radar lost contact at approximately 1½ miles due to heavy precipitation. Aircraft was advised of lost contact and continued approach as near minimums as was possible on standby instruments. He passed over the field 2 - 300 feet above the runway, right over the runway. The pilot sighted the aircraft parking ramp, then the runway and stated that he would try to keep it in sight and land in the opposite direction (runway 04). Twenty seconds after sighting the runway, the pilot stated he had lost it, and asked, "can you bring me around for a landing on runway 04?" Pilot was given clearance for landing on 04 and given wind as 230 degrees, 10 knots. Pilot acknowledged clearance and stated that he indicated that he was out of fuel and that he believed it. (Time 1702 CDT) Pilot then reported steady on 260 and, after a 20 second delay asked GCA whether they were going to bring him in or not. At this time, the GCA pattern controller, identifying the aircraft at 4½ miles west, and not knowing the request for landing on 04,, directed the final controller to give the aircraft right hand pattern as the precipitation was less heavy to the west. VP-05 was given right turn to 360 for cross wind to runway 22, and shortly thereafter was turned to 040 for down wind. Soon after turning to this heading, VP-05 pilot called 319th Operations and stated that he was in the clear and was very low on fuel. He was considering landing in some field. Conversation revealed that only one fuel low level light was on, and 319th Operations told him to try another approach. Radar operators hearing these transmissions, gave the aircraft a very tight low fuel approach and were unable to place the aircraft in a position to land. The aircraft was descended to 1000 MSL (177 feet above the terrain in turn to final approach.) VP-05 sighted some houses and trees, but did not see the base. The aircraft continued on final approach heading at low altitude for one minute and forty-five seconds, when he was instructed to climb to 2,500 feet. During this period, the pilot was requesting a vector to runway 04; however, radar did not have contact. After initiating climb, there followed another minute of conversation between the aircraft and 319th Operations which revealed that the second low level light had just come on. (1710 CDT) VP-05 had been instructed to climb to 2,500, after the GCA pattern controller told his final controller to take the final approach of VP-06. (VP-06 was on channel 17). The final controller assumed that VP-06 had been switched to channel 16 and initiated several calls to him. After finishing the fuel discussion with 319th Operations, the pilot of VP-05 mistakenly answered one of the calls to VP-06 and was given corrections that would line VP-06 up on the last 1½ miles of final approach. VP-05 complied with the headings meant for 06, taking him still further away from the field. (When the pattern controller did not hear his final controller come up on 17 for final approach of VP-06, he continued VP-06 on a surveillance approach, out of which the aircraft landed safely.) In actuality, both GCA controllers were directing VP-06 during this period. VP-05 broke out in the clear after VP-06 landed and contact with GCA was again established. Aircraft was identified as 22 miles Southwest on a heading of 180. (Aircraft was actually 17 miles Southwest.) There followed another minute of conversation with 319th Operations while still on 180 heading before contact with radar control was again established. At this time aircraft was instructed to turn to 220 and maintain 2,500 feet. Forty seconds later this heading was changed to 360 after a query by the pilot, and the last attempt to land was started. (Six minutes elapsed between missed approach and this turn back to the base.) The

approach was continued and the aircraft flamed out at 1717 CDT due to fuel starvation. The pilot zoomed up and ejected. The seat became entangled in the pilot chute; however, the pilot received only bruises in a successful ejection.





