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Red Arrows show weapon wheedling North
Korean solders







On Wednesday 18 August 1976 at 1040 hours in the morning, a United Nations Command (UNC) work force of five Korean Service Corps (KSC) personnel
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accompanied by and UNC security force, including the Joint Security Force (JSF) Commander, Captain (P) Arthur G. Bonifas of Newburgh, New York, First Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett of Columbia, South Carolina, and one Republic of (South) Korean Army (ROKA) officer started to prune a large tree in the vicinity of UNC Check Point #3. This tree partially obscured the view between UNC Check Point #3 and UNC Check Point #5. In addition the un-pruned tree was also blocking the view of the "Bridge of No Return" from "Freedom House." Shortly after the KSC work force arrived at the tree and began to cut it back, (North) Korean People's Army (KPA) personnel appeared at the work site. For a short time, the KPA security force observed the pruning without apparent concern. Suddenly, the KPA security force commander demanded that the JSF commander cease pruning or there would be trouble. Captain Bonifas did not order the operation stopped. Senior Lieutenant Pak Chul of the KPA, seeing that he was losing control, took off his wristwatch, wrapped it in his handkerchief and put it in his pocket. Another North Korean rolled up his sleeves. Lieutenant Pak then shouted "MI KUN UL CHU KI GI CHA." Translated, it means, "Kill the U.S. Aggressors."; the UNC security force was attacked by a superior force of 30 KPA guards wielding pick handles, knives, clubs, and axes. Senior Lieutenant Pak jumped on Captain Bonifas from the back forcing him to the ground where Bonifas was beaten to death. 1LT Barrett was also attacked. The KPA soldiers used the mattox and axes the tree trimming detail was using prune the tree as weapons. The North Korean attack was broken up when a UNC soldier drove his 2 1/2 ton truck into the fight and over Captain Bonifas to protect him. The UNC Security Force then withdrew but not before two American Army Officers were murdered and, a ROKA officer, three Korean Augmentees to the US Army (KATUSA) and four US enlisted men were wounded.
The UNC's response to the North Korean attack in the JSA was the planning and execution of "Operation Paul Bunyan."
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The primary American combat ground unit in the Republic of Korea is the US Army's 2nd Infantry (Indianhead) Division (2ID). Elements of the division were normally deployed tactically in camps north of Seoul to the DMZ and in from of the west coast about 40 kilometers. On any given day large elements of the division are in the field training for combat - 18 August 1976 was no exception. Upon notification of the murders at the JSA, all units of the UNC including I Corps (ROK/US) Group, all ROKA units, and the 2ID then under the command of Major General Morris J. Brady, were alerted and told to prepare for action. Some 2ID units were in the field training, and were above the Imjin River and its tributaries.
This proved to be no small obstacle, for about 20 kilometers east of Panmunjeom several bridges over the river had been rendered un-crossable due to high water from the previous three days of rain. The only bridge available to get back south for units training in the Santa Barbara Range area was the bridge at "Little Chicago." By the morning of 19 August 1976 those elements which were required to return to base camps to prepare for combat had done so and were deployed to their war positions to await orders.
Meanwhile, the governments of South Korea, and the United States conferred on all possible courses of action. All of us stationed in Korea at the time knew we could not let the North Koreans have their way, or there would be much more trouble later. Once the decision was made by governments involved, the planning for "Operation Paul Bunyan" began. The US Air Force moved in units from the Continental United States (CONUS), Okinawa, and Guam to Korea; and the US Navy moved the 7th Fleet consisting of the USS Midway carrier battle group to Korean Waters.
All units of the 2ID continued to improve their war fighting capabilities by moving to their war positions or locations designated by the Division Commander to support the operation. Battalion Ammunition Officers throughout the division were ordered to distribute their units "Basic Loads" and prepare for re-supply operations.
From 18 August 1976 through the morning of 21 August 1976 tensions along the DMZ were particularly tense. The North Koreans tried several times to shoot down US military aircraft patrolling just south of the southern boundary of the DMZ. The defensive radar sites were scanning very high amounts of increased activity on the Northern side of the DMZ. Soldiers of the quick reaction force of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu), 2ID, waited on a helicopter pad just minutes away from the JSA at Camps Kitty Hawk and Liberty Bell. Meanwhile elements of the 2ID Division Artillery were positioned at firing point 4P1 (North of the Imjin River) and at (South of the Imjin River) Camp Pelhem in Munsan Ni/Songuri; the home of the 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (DS). In addition, firing batteries from the 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery (DS) had also deployed to positions close enough to support Operation Paul Bunyan.
Elsewhere in the 2nd Infantry Division area, tensions were very high. All personnel were preparing for combat, even the biggest duds turned into soldiers. The troops were especially interested in what was happening at Panmunjom while we prepared for war, the mood turned from shock after receiving the news of the murders to "Lets go cut that damn tree down." If the North Koreans really wanted to make an issue over it - we would be only to happy to oblige them.
On Saturday 21 August 1976, everything was ready. All units who were to participate in "Operation Paul Bunyan" were in position and personnel briefed." Coordination between ROK military and US military units was well exercised.
At 0645 hours, the UN JSA Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Vierra gave a message to the "Joint Duty Officer" (JDO) to be handed to his KPA (North Korean) counterpart. The message stated that at 0700 hours this day a UNC work force would be entering the "security area" of the JSA and commence to pruning the tree in vicinity of CP3. In addition, the message stated that should there be no interference, the work force would depart the JSA compound."
At 0700 hours, Task Force Vierra entered the JSA security compound and moved directly to the Poplar tree next to CP3. Along with the work force was approximately 60 ROK Special Forces soldiers forming a ring around the 16 engineer soldiers from the 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2ID, cutting the tree. In addition, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu), 2ID moved into position as a quick reaction force to support the Task Force Vierra. Behind the 2/9th was a forward observer from the 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery (Steel Behind the Rock), 2ID waiting for orders to fire a massed artillery strike. Behind him were AH-1 "Cobra" gunships orbiting just out of site beyond the ridges, then F-111 Fighter Bombers, and behind and way above them were B-52 Stratofortresse's.
As the engineers began cutting the tree, there was little or no reaction from the North Koreans. They were totally taken by surprise, and had no clue about what they should do because of the show of force made by the ROKUS forces was so unexpected.
When the engineers had completed there mission of cutting the tree down, Task Force Vierra, the JSA Security Force and all vehicles departed the JSA compound.
However, "Operation Paul Bunyan" was not over, only the overt part of the operation had been completed. Over the next few weeks the units of the 2nd Infantry Division and UNC Joint Security Force - JSA remained on a high state of alert to counteract any military action taken by the North Koreans.
Participating Units of "Operation Paul Bunyan"
8th United States Army
I Corps (ROKUS) Group
51st Signal Battalion, I Corps
2nd Infantry Division
Task Force Brady
Armored Task Force - 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry; 1st Battalion, 72nd Armor
2nd Aviation Battalion
52nd Aviation Battalion
1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu)
2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu)
4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry
2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (DS)
1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery (DS)
6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (GS)
Task Force Vierra
JSA Security Force
B Company, 2nd Engineer Battalion
D Company, 44th Engineer Battalion
1st ROK Division Reconnaissance Company
1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry
1st ROK Special Forces Brigade
38th ADA Brigade
Various US Air Force units (F-4s, F-111s, B-52s)
US Navy 7th Fleet & the aircraft carrier USS Midway
The Monument