

59-0139
18 MAY 61

456 FIS

REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AFR 62-14 and AFM 62-5. Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. DATE OF ACCIDENT 18 May 61		2. HOUR AND TIME ZONE (Local) 1015 C		3. DAY DAWN NIGHT DUSK Day		4. AIRFIELD OF LAST TAKEOFF Andrews AFB, Md.	
PLACE OF ACCIDENT: (a) Distance (Nautical Miles) and direction from nearest airport (if on an airport, identify) Duluth Muni Arpt (on base) (b) Distance (Nautical Miles) and direction from nearest town (include state and county) N/A							
6. AIRPORT DATA. Fill in (a) or (b) as applicable (For seaplanes landing on seadrome, fill in length of landing lanes and other data as applicable. Discuss in Section K.)							
(a) If accident occurred on airport: Length of runway in use 8,000 ft. Heading of runway in use 270 Degrees. Field Elevation 1430 Ft. MSL Type of runway surface: (Check) Concrete <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Asphalt _____ Other _____ (Specify) _____ Wet _____ Dry _____				(b) If accident occurred off airport: Elevation at scene of accident N/A Ft. MSL. Was aircraft taking off, approaching or maneuvering to land? Yes _____ No _____ If Yes, state airport involved _____ If No, state nearest airport suitable for landing this aircraft _____ For either airport mentioned in 6b above: State airport type (i.e., AF, A, N, CG, PC, P) _____ Heading of runway in use _____ Degrees. Airport elevation _____ Ft. MSL.			
7. CLEARANCE: (Check all applicable) IFR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VFR _____ Local <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DD Form 175 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other _____ Cleared Direct <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cleared via airway _____ Cleared from Andrews AFB, Md. Cleared to Duluth Muni Arpt, Minn							
8. Base submitting report Duluth Municipal Airport				9. Duration of flight 2+00		10. Mission of flight Return from TDY	
11. ALTITUDE DATA: (a) Altitude of aircraft above terrain at which accident sequence began 0 Ft. (b) Altitude, MSL, at which accident sequence began, or at which failure occurred 1430 (field elev) Ft. MSL. (c) Highest altitude, MSL, aircraft flown on this flight 44,000 Ft. MSL. Length of time at this highest altitude 1+30 List Numbers of all Other Aircraft Involved (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft) (a) Was aircraft painted in accordance with standard Air Force conspicuity criteria? Yes _____ No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> If Yes, discuss in Section K. VIOLATIONS: Yes _____ No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> If Yes, discuss in Section K. BREACHES OF AIR DISCIPLINE: Yes _____ No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> If Yes, discuss in Section K.							

Section B—AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT NUMBER 59-139		16. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES AND BLOCK NUMBER F106 A, 135			17. ASSIGNMENT AND STATUS CODE at time of accident: CC (As specified in AFR 65-110)		
ORGANIZATION POSSESSING AND REPORTING AIRCRAFT ON AF-110 REPORTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT							
or Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base	
ADC	N/A	28 ADV	SF ADS	N/A	456 FIS	Castle AFB, Cal	
19. IF AIRCRAFT WAS BEING FERRIED OR DELIVERED INDICATE (Gaining and losing organizations, date of transfer, ultimate destination) N/A							

Section C—PILOT(S) INVOLVED (Flight Crew)

20. OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)							
a. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME Doncklau, Everett Eugene			GRADE 1/Lt	COMPONENT USAF	SERVICE NUMBER 57570A	NATIONALITY USA	YR. OF BIRTH [REDACTED]
b. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Front or Left Seat <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rear or Right Seat _____				c. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER AC _____ IP _____ P <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CP _____ Other (Specify) _____			
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION							
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base	
ADC	N/A	28th ADV	SF ADS	N/A	456 FIS	Castle AFB, Cal	
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR FLYING							
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base	
f. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot May 1957		g. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot May 1957		h. INSTRUMENT CARD Type White AF Form 8 Date of expiration 23 Aug 61		i. AFSC Primary 1125 F Duty 1125F	
21. OTHER PILOT							
a. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME None			GRADE	COMPONENT	SERVICE NUMBER	NATIONALITY	YR. OF BIRTH
b. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Front or Left Seat _____ Rear or Right Seat _____ Other _____				c. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER AC _____ IP _____ P _____ CP _____ Other (Specify) _____			
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION							
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base	
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR FLYING							
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base	
f. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED		g. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED		h. INSTRUMENT CARD Type _____ Date of expiration _____		i. AFSC Primary _____ Duty _____	

NOTE: IF MORE THAN TWO PILOTS ARE INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) REPORT SAME INFORMATION REQUIRED IN SECTION C ON ADDITIONAL SHEET FOR EACH.

Section D—FLYING EXPERIENCE OF PILOT(S) INVOLVED

22. WAS OPERATOR ON INSTRUMENTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE: Yes _____ No X Unknown _____ If "Yes," check one
 Weather _____ Hood _____

ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER NOTE: List all time to the nearest hour	(Complete items 23 through 39 for each crewmember pilot)				
	PILOT (Last Name) Dencklau	CO-PILOT (Last Name)	INSTR. PILOT (Last Name)	AIRCRAFT CMDR. (Last Name)	STUDENT PILOT (Last Name)
23. Total flying hours (including AF time, student time & other accredited time)	1019				
24. Total jet time	780				
25. Total 1st pilot/IP hours, all aircraft	712				
26. Total weather instrument hours	38				
27. Total 1st pilot and IP this model (F-100)	213				
28. Total 1st pilot and IP this series (F-100C)	207				
29. Total pilot hours last 90 days	89				
30. Total 1st pilot and IP hours last 90 days	30				
31. Total pilot hours weather and hood last 90 days	15				
32. Total pilot hours night last 90 days	12				
33. Total 1st pilot and IP last 90 days this model	77				
34. Total 1st pilot and IP last 30 days this model	38				
35. Total 1st pilot and IP last 90 days this series	71				
36. Total 1st pilot and IP last 30 days this series	39				
37. Date and duration, last previous flight this model	17 May 61 2				
38. Date and duration, last previous flight this series	17 May 61 2				
39. Date of last proficiency flight check	22 Jan 61				

40. INSTRUCTIONS: Attach a copy of AF Form 5 for pilot(s) involved as outlined in AFR 62-14.

(See TAB F)

Section E—PERSONNEL INVOLVED

(Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at time of accident 41.	Name (Last name first, Grade, Serial Number and Component or Service) 42.	Type Aero Rating 43.	ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT Command, Subcommand, Group Number and Type, Base 44.	Injury Class. (or missing) 45.	Parachute Used		Ejection Seat Used	
					Yes 46.	No 47.	Yes 48.	No 49.
Plt ol	Dencklau, Everett E. 1/Lt 57570A, USAF	P	ADC; 28th Air Div, SFADS, N/A, 456th FIS, Castle AFB, Calif.	Minor 2		X		X

NOTE: If additional space is required to list all personnel involved, attach additional sheet.

Section F—WEATHER

(At time and place of accident)

Sky Conditions	Visibility	Wind Direction and Velocity	Temperature	Dew Point	Alt. Setting	Other Weather Conditions
17	15+	E 5	47°F	39°F	30.31	None

If weather, including wind conditions, was a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

A flight of six (6) F-106A aircraft were enroute from Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida to Castle Air Force Base, California, after a routine Flight Deployment for Weapons Training. The flight flew from Tyndall AFB, Florida to Andrews AFB, Md. 17 May 1961. The flight of six (6) aircraft departed Andrews AFB, Md. on a DD 175 aircraft clearance at 1400Z 18 May 1961, using the call sign "UH 26" flight enroute to Duluth Municipal Airport, Minnesota (See Tab M). The route of flight was from Andrews AFB, Md. direct to Herndon TACAN, direct to Pittsburgh TACAN, direct to Cleveland TACAN, direct to Pullman TACAN, direct to Milwaukee TACAN, direct to Duluth TACAN. The estimated time enroute was one hour and 55 minutes. All aircraft had 9,945 pounds of fuel aboard at take-off with 2 hours 30 minutes of fuel on board. The weather at the time of the DD form 175 briefing for Duluth was 1700 feet broken, 3000 broken, 6000 overcast, visibility 7 miles, surface wind from the North at 7 miles. The forecast weather for Duluth was 6000 feet overcast, visibility 10 miles.

Lt Colonel James L. Price briefed the flight prior to take-off. Duluth was selected as the best F-106A Base to fly to from Andrews AFB as weather conditions were unsatisfactory on any other route proceeding West. Prior arrangements were made with the Chief of Maintenance of the 343rd Fighter Group via telephone hot line to turn around the six F-106A aircraft here, as Duluth is an "Official Business Only" base. Permission was granted. The NOTAMS for Duluth were checked and noted. From the pilots' testimony, they were aware that the first 1,000 feet of runway at Duluth is classified as overrun and that downdrafts can occur at the approach end of runway 27 (see Tabs P1 & P2). They appeared familiar with the BAK-6 jet barriers at Duluth. The flight was briefed for two (2) three (3) information take-offs at Andrews AFB with a VFR traffic pattern to be accomplished at Duluth.

The DD form 175 indicated the following pilots' and aircraft positions within the flight: (see Tab M).

<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>F-106A aircraft number</u>
UH 26	Lt Col James L. Price	59-117
UH 26A	Capt William A. Curnutte	59-140
UH 26B	Capt Robert A. Hamblin	59-125
UH 26C	Capt Keith R. Young	59-138
UH 26D	Capt Donald N. Orth	59-146
UH 26E	1/Lt Everett E. Denoklau	59-139

The flight remained in two elements with UH 26 leading the first flight and UH 26C leading the second element about one mile behind, but within easy visual contact. The flight continued as briefed. At Milwaukee a check was made on the present Duluth weather. It was

This was lower than anticipated as indicated in the pilots' statements (see Tabs G, K & M). The flight continued to Duluth.

Duluth Air Defense Sector (call sign Majority) was contacted forty-eight (48) miles Southeast requesting a SAGE-GCA straight-in penetration as they were short on fuel (see Tabs O-1). The flight was approaching

Duluth from a south-easterly direction. The Intercept Director at Majority informed UH 26 that the active runway was 09. However, he stated that the surface winds were from the east at three (3) miles. Would they accept an "East Gate" approach to Runway 27 for landing. An East Gate approach and landing was accepted by UH 26. UH 26 then split the six (6) aircraft flight in two (2) elements of three (3) aircraft for the weather penetration and approach. Meanwhile Majority Intercept Director technician was contacting Duluth tower for the approach clearance to the East Gate and landing on runway 27. Runway 09 was the active runway and Duluth tower questioned the requested clearance but approved it upon learning of the fuel shortage problem. The Intercept Director Technician contacted Duluth GCA for a precision approach to runway 27. Duluth GCA questioned the reason for a GCA to runway and advised that only a surveillance approach would be available for this approach. (see Tab 01). The Intercept Director contacted UH 26 flight, composed of UH 26, UH 26A, and UH 26B and UH 26C flight, composed of UH 26C, UH 26D and UH 26E and asked if a GCA surveillance approach was alright. Both flights accepted the surveillance approach. UH 26 flight started a SAGE-GCA penetration. They were turned over to Duluth GCA over the East Gate. UH 26 flight continued inbound under GCA control until about five (5) miles out. At this time they were VFR and had the base in sight. UH 26 flight discontinued the GCA and contacted Duluth Tower for landing instructions. The flight made a normal VFR overhead traffic pattern to runway 27 with three second spacing on the pitch out. UH 26, UH 26A and UH 26B landed without incident.

At the time UH 26 flight was penetrating for their SAGE-GCA approach, UH 26C flight was given some spacing turns while waiting for their penetration and approach. UH 26C contacted Majority and asked for a penetration soon, as they were low on fuel (see Tab 01). About this time, or shortly before, approximately 50 miles East of Duluth, UH 26C relinquished lead of the flight to UH 26D as he was the only aircraft in this three ship flight with accurate TACAN equipment operating (see Tab 12). Majority put UH 26C flight in a penetration to the East Gate. UH 26E, in UH 26C flight, asked if it was to be a formation landing (see Tab 0). UH 26C was now on the left wing of UH 26D who was leading. He advised against it due to runway width and said the high man on fuel would break out of traffic at GCA minimums and make a closed traffic pattern. After a fuel check UH 26C said that he would make the closed pattern, leaving UH 26D leading UH 26E in on his right wing in formation for the full stop landing.

Majority turned UH 26C flight over to GCA for the surveillance approach. About four (4) miles out on the approach, GCA radio transmissions with GCA were unreadable. UH 26D had his flight change to tower frequency for a straight-in full stop landing. UH 26D told UH 26C to start his go-around and closed pattern at about one and one-half (1½) miles which he did. UH 26D with UH 26E continued straight in. UH 26D indicated that his final approach speed was 200 knots indicated (see Tab 13). From the statements of witnesses, this flight appeared extremely low on the final approach (see Tabs 14, 15, 16). Lieutenants Showalter and Kraus, two qualified F-106A pilots on alert duty, were observing the landing from their position in the Alert Hangar (see Tabs 15, 16). They indicated that UH 26D landed about 50 feet down on the 95 foot black top blast pad at the end of the overrun. UH 26E touched down 51 feet short of the black top blast pad on the incline leading

up to the overrun (see Tabs Q diagram 2 & Tab R). UH 26E burst into flames immediately upon impact, driving both main landing gear into the wings. The landing gear then sheared from the aircraft (see Tab Q diagram 2). The aircraft slid up on to the overrun and continued to slide down the runway shedding pieces and spraying the runway with fuel (see Tab Q diagram 1). The BAK-6 barrier supported by rubber grommets, located 530 feet from the runway threshold, was in position. This was not taken down prior to the landings as there was insufficient time for the service crew to remove it. The runway landing direction was changed only for these six (6) aircraft. UH 26E slid over this BAK-6 barrier apparently snapping the cable upon passing over it. UH 26E began veering to the left, leaving the runway 3,100 feet from the threshold lights. He continued to slide another 400 feet and came to a rest 150 feet left of the runway, 20 degrees from the runway heading (see Tab Q diagram 1). While the aircraft was sliding, Lt. Deneklau the pilot, unfastened the two (2) parachute clasps to release him from the rotational upward ejection Type B seat and the incorporated parachute. After stopping, Lt. Deneklau started to open the canopy normally. He then noted the flames and decided to jettison the canopy which departed the aircraft when he raised the ejection lever on the left side of the seat. He immediately raised himself out of the seat and abandoned the aircraft over the right side. He was met by the fire department who turned him over to the flight surgeon a few minutes later (see Tab G). The fire department responded almost immediately to the tower alert call of the crash, managed to control the fire, eventually extinguishing it completely. UH 26D continued his landing roll uneventfully. UH 26C circled the base until the runway was cleared of the major portions of the debris. He then landed without incident.

F-106A

59-139

61-5-18-1


F I N D I N G S

The board having carefully considered the evidence before it finds that:

PRIMARY CAUSE:


1. The primary cause of this accident was supervision, in that the element leader misjudged his final approach and touchdown point for an F-106 formation landing, causing his wingman to touchdown short and below the level of the runway overrun.


AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT F-106A 54H 59-0139 18 MAY 1961



NORTH


DIAGRAM I






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DIAGRAM II



4656 GI 343 ABRON



163 A 61 343ABRON