

**59-0089**

29 Nov 72

87<sup>th</sup> FIS

**USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT**

*(Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s).)*

1. DATE OF OCCURRENCE (Day, month and year) <b>26 November 1972 Sunday</b>	2. VEHICLE(S)/MATERIEL INVOLVED (Model designation and serial no. if applicable) <b>F-106A, SN 59-089</b>	3. FOR GROUND ACCIDENTS ONLY (Base Code and Report Serial No.) <div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold; text-align: center;">72-17-26-1</div>														
4. PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: STATE, COUNTY, DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM NEAREST TOWN. IF ON-BASE, IDENTIFY. IF OFF-BASE GIVE DISTANCE FROM NEAREST BASE. <b>Novato (Marin Co) CA, 3.8 NM Northwest of Hamilton AFB</b>	5. HOUR AND TIME (ZONE LOCAL (EST)) <b>0952:30 PST</b>	6. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DAY <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/> DAWN <input type="checkbox"/> DUSK														
7. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING/OWNING VEHICLE OR MATERIEL AT TIME OF MISHAP <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width:15%;">MAJOR COMMAND</td> <td style="width:15%;">SUBCOMMAND OR AF</td> <td style="width:15%;">AIR DIVISION</td> <td style="width:15%;">WING</td> <td style="width:15%;">GROUP</td> <td style="width:15%;">SQUADRON OR UNIT</td> <td style="width:20%;">NAME AND BASE CODE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ADC</td> <td>-</td> <td>23d</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>87 FIS</td> <td>K. I. Sawyer AFB, MI LWPC</td> </tr> </table>			MAJOR COMMAND	SUBCOMMAND OR AF	AIR DIVISION	WING	GROUP	SQUADRON OR UNIT	NAME AND BASE CODE	ADC	-	23d	-	-	87 FIS	K. I. Sawyer AFB, MI LWPC
MAJOR COMMAND	SUBCOMMAND OR AF	AIR DIVISION	WING	GROUP	SQUADRON OR UNIT	NAME AND BASE CODE										
ADC	-	23d	-	-	87 FIS	K. I. Sawyer AFB, MI LWPC										

8. (List organizations of second vehicle, if they differ from item 7 above)

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9. ORGANIZATION AND BASE SUBMITTING REPORT (Do not abbreviate).  
**23d Air Division (ADC), Duluth International Airport, Minnesota**

**10. LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED**  
*(See AFM 127-2 and AFR 127-4 for specific instructions)*

LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE INITIAL	GRADE	BSAN	ASSIGNED DUTY	ACRO RATING	PERSONNEL (Use Abbr)	DAYS LOST (ON TT ONLY)
Burmeister, Michael D.	Capt	[REDACTED]	FP	Pilot	F	
Whelan, Michael B.	Civ	-	-	-	1st AIG	
Smith, Gerald N.	Civ	-	-	-	1st AIG	
Feis, Linda Ann	Civ	-	-	-	1st AIG	
Wright, Pamela J.	Civ	-	-	-	1st AIG	
Mazurette, Kathleen M.	Civ	-	-	-	1st AIG	

*(Enter applicable letter(s) in DEGREE INJURY column. None-N; Temporary Total-TT; Permanent Partial-PP; Permanent Total-PT; Fatal-F; Missing-M)*

11. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT: Give a detailed history of flight, or chronological order of facts, and circumstances leading to the mishap, the results of investigation and analysis, to include discussion of all cause factors listed, findings, and recommendations, and any corrective action taken.

**Attached:**


**a. History of Flight.**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12. AUTHENTICATION

13. (For Accident Inves Board)	TYPED NAME AND GRADE <b>ALLEN T. ENSLEN, Col, USAF</b>	SIGNATURE 	DATE <b>12 Dec 72</b>
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Paragraph 11a, AF Form 711

### HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On the morning of 26 November 1972, two F-106 aircraft of the 87 Fighter Interceptor Squadron, departed Hamilton Air Force Base, California, for a return trip to K. I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan, via Buckley Air National Guard Base, Colorado. They were returning home from a parts delivery mission to Hamilton. The flight leader, Captain David Kolodzinski, accomplished the flight planning, obtained the weather briefing, and filed a DD Form 175 at 0845 PST for a 1000 PST departure. The flight's call sign was LIMA HOTEL ZERO FIVE FLIGHT. The wingman was Captain Michael D. Burmeister in aircraft #59-089. Both aircraft had external tanks and a full load of fuel.

Captain Kolodzinski then drove back to the BOQ office parking lot, where he met Captain Michael Burmeister at approximately 0900 as they had agreed to do the night before. Although Capt Burmeister had already received a weather briefing by telephone, the two discussed the weather at Hamilton and Buckley in detail. They then checked out of the BOQ and picked up Captain Manly Ray, who accompanied them to their aircraft. While driving to the flight line, Capt Kolodzinski gave Capt Burmeister a duplicate AF Form 70 and a Hamilton AFB Standard Instrument Departure (SID). He told Capt Burmeister that they were filed for a Kenwood Two departure. Capt Kolodzinski then stated that the departure consisted of a right turnout to 010 degrees to intercept the 340 degrees radial of the Hamilton TACAN. They would use the LINDEN transition to LINDEN and then it was J-84 all the way to Buckley. Capt Kolodzinski then stated that he would go ahead and lead and Capt Burmeister could plan the next leg. The pilots then arrived at their aircraft and loaded Capt Burmeister's luggage in his aircraft. Captain Ray then drove to Transient Services and informed them the pilots were at their aircraft.

While waiting for Transient Services, Capt Kolodzinski continued briefing Capt Burmeister. Captain Kolodzinski stated that he would lead a close formation take-off and give standard head nods for brake release and afterburner light. He told Capt Burmeister that he would not use a signal for gear up and would give the standard afterburner signal at 250 knots. If an abort occurred on take-off, it was briefed to call it and stay on your side of the runway. Captain Kolodzinski then stated that weather had reported the cloud tops at 1100 feet, and if Mike had any problems on take-off, to get separation and join on top. It was not discussed how this separation would be accomplished. It was covered that in event of any communication problems enroute, that the flight would go to Channel 2 (87 FIS Squadron common); also, upon arrival at Buckley, they would

make a formation landing, winds permitting, with standard signals for gear down and speed brakes. Captain Burmeister was asked if everything sounded O.K., and he alertly responded, "Real fine".

Both pilots then accomplished their pre-flight walk-around inspections. As Capt Kolodzinski was strapping in, Capt Burmeister yelled to him and said his parachute and helmet were gone. Captain Kolodzinski told him that he would wait while Capt Burmeister located his gear. Captain Ray drove Capt Burmeister to Hangar 5 and the parachute and helmet were located in the Speedline office. They then went back to the aircraft.

Both aircraft started at the same time and check-in was made at 0943 PST on ground/clearance delivery frequency. The clearance was copied with no problems and taxi was normal. Transient Service personnel gave both aircraft a last chance inspection just prior to the aircraft's taking the runway. [REDACTED]

The formation take-off, with the wingman (LH-05A) on the right side, was normal except it was noticed that the wingman's speed brakes were open. Captain Ray had stayed to watch the take-off and noticed the open speed brakes just after gear retraction. Tower personnel noticed the open speed brakes just after the aircraft rotated (main wheels still on the runway) and reported it to RAPCON. Take-off time was 0951 PST.

Captain Kolodzinski noticed his wingman fading back just after gear retraction and gave him some more power. The wingman stayed well within sight without the leader straining to see him. Afterburner was terminated at 250 knots. Upon reaching the departure end of the runway, the flight disappeared into the clouds. The weather at time of take-off was 400 feet overcast, three miles visibility with fog and calm winds. PIREPS had established the cloud tops at 1100 feet. The flight leader looked at his wingman prior to starting his right turn and the formation position was good but slightly back. A 25 degree bank, climbing right turn, was established and lead looked at his wingman once more. He noticed that Capt Burmeister had moved out about two to three ship widths. Captain Kolodzinski checked his gauges, then looked at his wingman once more and noticed he was still two to three ship widths out line abreast, and stabilized. At this point, lead made his airborne call to departure and this was recorded at 0952 PST.

At 0952:15 PST RAPCON told LH-05 flight that speed brakes had been observed open on one aircraft during take-off. This call was "Rogered" by LH-05 at 0952:20 PST.

At 0952:25 PST Captain Burmeister (LH-05A) called that he had lost lead. At 0952:30 PST lead called, "O.K. Just go ahead and drop back in trail. I'm on top now at about 1100 feet." Captain Burmeister did not acknowledge this call or any others.



Captain Kolodzinski (LH-05) intercepted the 340 degrees radial and at 0953:45 PST called RAPCON that he saw a big cloud of smoke that had come up through the cloud layer in his "seven-thirty" position. RAPCON and LH-05 tried to contact LH-05 ALPHA with no success.

At 0956:15 PST tower activated the crash phone stating there was a possible off-base crash approximately four miles northwest of Hamilton. At 0958:45 PST RAPCON told LH-05 that police in Novato had confirmed the crash but had no further reports. Captain Kolodzinski then returned to Hamilton and landed.

At approximately 1030 PST the Hamilton AFB Fire Department and Base Ambulance arrived at the crash site. The Novato Fire Department and Police were already at the scene and the pilot had been reported dead.