59-0021 15 May 73

 $49^{th} \, FIS$

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Major Aircraft Accident F-106A, SN 59-021 15 May 73, 1424 EDT

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On the afternoon of 15 May 1973, an annual proficiency/tactical evaluation flight check for Major General Price (Kilo Hotel 01) and the flight examiner, Lt Col Suzanne, (Kilo Hotel 12) flying as chase aircraft was scheduled. Daily flight Authorization/Clearance Form (49th FIS Form 85) was used for flight authorization. Major General Price was assigned aircraft 59-021, configured with two external tanks, one MSR and two WSEM's.

Briefing: Pre-mission events consisted of a review of the Squadron Aircrew Information File, a personal equipment briefing by the NCOIC of the Life Support Section, and a Flight Simulator Emergency Bold Face procedure check administered by the flight examiner, Lt Col Suzanne. The mission briefing for the flight began at 1300 EDT at the 49 FIS Operations Section and was briefed by the flight examiner. The briefing covered enroute, arrival, alternate weather; aircraft assignments, a general overview of the mission, formation techniques, emergency procedures, pre-flight and before take-off checks, and other applicable items in accordance with ADCM 51-106. The flight was planned for a formation take-off and an instrument departure to the MAC I Intercept Training Area within block altitudes 33,000 to 38,000 feet. The 21st Air Div SAGE was to be the intercept activity controlling agency, with the callisign of "Incognito". The intercept phase was to consist of Front/Stern reattacks for KH01 with KH12 as the target aircraft. At the completion of the intercept phase the flight was to RTB with a GCA low approach led by KH01, to be followed by KH12 as lead aircraft with KH01 flying wing for several GCA approaches if the weather was at least 2500 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility.

Pre-Flight, Taxi and Take-off: Major General Price reported to his aircraft some 45 minutes prior to the scheduled take-off time of 1430 EDT.

Engines were started at 1400 EDT and KHOl called for a check in by KHI2 on squadron common after showing Sgt McKee his seat pin was removed. During taxi out ground control asked KHOl if he was ready to copy the flight IFR clearance and KHOl replied that he would copy it at the end of runway inspection point. The flight taxied to the end of runway inspection point and the supervisor,

ground control for the flight clearance, received the clearance, and A-2

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read it back to ground control. KHOl called the flight over to tower frequency and checked the flight in with 'pins, canopy, pressure, breaker". The flight was then cleared to taxi up to, and hold short of, the runway. After a momentary delay KHUI flight was then cleared to take off and to contact departure control on departure frequency. KH0l then taxied the flight into position for engine runup with KH0l on the left side of Runway 15 with KH12 in the right wing position. Engine runup was completed the take off signal given and the flight began the roll and were airborne at 1422 EDT. Shortly after becoming airborne, for reasons unknown, KHOl deviated from the departure clearance given to the flight in that he called KH01 off the deck left turn" when the clearance was "maintain runway heading for radar vectors". This call was made at 1422:17. Departure control acknowledged KH01's transmission. KH01 flew a smooth lead position in a left 30 degree bank, climbing and accelerating to climb speed, proceeding to intercept the radial of the Standard Instrument Departure (SID) for which the flight was cleared. After turning approximately 35 degrees, and shortly after entering the clouds at 3500 to 4000 feet approaching 400 kts, still in a 30 degree left bank, a large bolt of lightning apparently struck KH01's aircraft. 🐃

KHI2 then called over the radio 'KH01 did you get hit?''. This call was made at 1423:05 EDT. There was no response. KH12 then checked his flight instruments and instrument panel, with everything appearing normal. The bank angle was still 30 degrees left bank, KH12 then returned to flying the wing position momentarily. There was no visible damage noted on the right side of the lead aircraft and after approximately 30 seconds of flying wing, KH12 rechecked his Attitude Direction Indicator (ADI)

At this point chase then rolled away to the right and transmitted ''01 roll out''. This call was made at 1423:44 EDT. The total elapsed time from KH01's call to Departure control ''off the deck left turn'', until KH12's transmission of ''01 roll out'', was timed at one minute and twenty-seven seconds. The chase aircraft was recovered to level flight at about 5000 feet on a heading of 010 degrees. Departure control was advised that KH01 flight was separated and KH12 was climbing to VFR conditions. Departure control tried to contact KH01 with no response. Departure control also lost SIF and Radar contact with KH01.

KH01 impacted the ground in a heavily wooded area two miles East Northeast of Holland Patent, NY (8 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles East of Griffiss Air Force Base). The pilot received fatal injuries.

A-3

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